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Review of Levy and Glimcher
Shall I go see a movie tonight, or rather
buy some Chinese food? Obviously, such
choices between different classes of goods
(“reward types”) are conceptually com-
plex and methodologically challenging to
investigate. Yet, they occur frequently in
everyday life. How, then, does the brain
solve such problems? The view that di-
verse behavioral acts and sensory stimuli
may be compared via a value signal that is
computed on a common scale, much like
an internal currency (Montague and
Berns, 2002), is gaining traction in deci-
sion neuroscience and neuroeconomics.
According to this notion, a decision value
is computed for each option. These are then
compared,andtheoptionwiththehighestde-
cision value is most likely chosen. Such com-
parisonsrequirethatdecisionvaluesareonthe
same scale—which is what the notion of a
commoncurrency captures.
The idea that choices can be described
as the outcome of maximizing decision
value (usually called decision utility in
economics) is not new: it is at the very core
of how economic theory describes con-
sumer behavior. However, economic the-
ory has been purposefully agnostic about
whether there is actually a neural correlate
of decision value, orwhether this ismerely
a mathematically convenient description
that predicts behavior well. When the
groundwork for this approach was laid in
the first half of the 20th century, this ag-
nosticismwasmotivated chiefly by the as-
sertion that valuation in the brain was
practically inaccessible to direct measure-
ment. The development of “revealed pref-
erence theory” (Samuelson, 1938) hence
inverted the deductive chain and held that
preferences (which imply decision values)
can be inferred from choice, as long as
choices are sufficiently consistent. More
recently, however, due to advances in
brain imaging technology, the question of
whether this is actually how choices are
implemented in the brain has become di-
rectly testable.
A growing body of neuroscientific re-
search addresses this question. Previous
studies in this vein have typically pro-
ceeded in two phases. In a first phase, de-
cision values for choice options were
estimated behaviorally, for a variety of re-
ward types (e.g., food, non-food trinkets,
monetary rewards). In a second phase,
participants were exposed to the same
choice options in an fMRI (functional
magnetic resonance imaging) scanner.
For each reward type, the researchers then
identified regions in which neural activity
correlated with the behaviorally estimated
decision values. Regions in which activ-
ity correlates with all reward types are
deemed candidates for common currency
calculation.
Levy and Glimcher (2011) proceeded
in a similar fashion. Participants were ex-
posed to choice situations in which they
were asked to choose between options
from three different reward types: water,
food, and money. In some trials, both op-
tions were from the same reward type
(e.g., a certain small amount of water vs a
larger but stochastic amount of water).
These “same-type” trials permitted the
authors to estimate decision values for
each reward type and participant, as in
previous work. However, crucially, there
were also “mixed” trials where the two op-
tions that could be chosen were from dif-
ferent reward types. From these mixed
trials, the authors estimated “scaling fac-
tors,” which are a sort of behavioral ex-
change rate that makes it possible to
convert decision values for all three re-
ward types to a common scale. While pre-
vious work has shown that decision values
for several different reward types are en-
coded in spatially overlapping brain re-
gions (Chib et al., 2009), this by itself did
not permit the conclusion that they are
also encoded on the same scale, which is
essential to the concept of common cur-
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rency. This gap is filled by the work of
Levy and Glimcher (2011).
In a later session, participants were pre-
sentedwitha series of same-reward-type tri-
als in an fMRI scanner. The authors then
identified brain regions whose blood oxy-
genation level-dependent (BOLD) signal
correlated with the common-scale decision
values of the options presented. These deci-
sion values were estimated from the choices
in the behavioral sessions, and converted to
a common scale using the estimated scaling
factors from themixed trials.
The fMRI analysis revealed regions
that encoded decision values selectively
for one of the two reward types (posterior
cingulate cortex for money and hypotha-
lamic areas for food), as well as a subre-
gion of ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC) that correlated with common-
scale decision values for both reward
types. The authors interpret this as evi-
dence that value signals are likely first
computed in several distinct reward-type-
specific regions, and then converge in the
vmPFC, in which decision values are en-
coded on the same scale, enabling direct
comparison.
The identification of vmPFC as a com-
mon currency decision value area is in line
with what has been proposed in previous
work (Chib et al., 2009). It is further cor-
roborated by a large body of research that,
while not targeting common currency per
se, has investigated decision values for a
variety of other reward types (for an over-
view, refer to Fehr and Rangel, 2011).
Examples range from simple choices
among foods or trinkets, tomore complex
choices, e.g., between monetary gambles,
delayed monetary rewards, or donations
to charity. Together, there is thus consid-
erable evidence that vmPFC correlates
with decision values formany different re-
ward types.
However, testing these correlations
separately, one reward type at a time, is
not sufficient to establish the notion of a
common currency. As Levy and Glimcher
(2011) point out, this demonstrates a spa-
tial overlap, but it does not follow that the
neural decision value signal for different
reward types is also on the same scale. The
method of using mixed-type trials to esti-
mate exchange rates (scaling factors)
across different reward types allows the
authors to test this common scale prop-
erty. The results support a fundamental
tenet of the common currency hypothesis,
since it is precisely the common scale
property that would enable the compari-
son of decision values across reward types.
We note that the research reviewed
here, as well as (to our knowledge) all pre-
vious work undertaken on common cur-
rency for decision values, presents stimuli
visually at the time of decision. However,
outside the laboratory, choices in which
the options are experienced via different
sensory modalities occur frequently. For
instance, at a restaurant, you may hear a
waiter describe some of the dishes avail-
able, yet prefer to order what you smell
from the table behind instead. A truly
universal common currency area thus
ought also to encode decision values for
options presented across different sen-
sory modalities.
Surprisingly, this appears not yet to
have been directly tested. Perhaps this is
due to the comparative ease of presenting
stimuli visually in the scanner. However,
with the increasing spread of MRI-
compatible olfactometers, gustatometers,
and tactile stimulators, the required tech-
nology is now more readily accessible than
ever.
Levy and Glimcher’s (2011) approach
of harnessing mixed-choice situations to
establish common-scale encoding seems
well suited for adaption to cases where op-
tions are presented using gustatory, olfac-
tory, or, perhaps most easily, auditory
modalities. For instance, participants might
hear short acoustic samples of songs, before
making their choice of which song(s) they
would like to receive as a full copy. In anal-
ogy to Levy andGlimcher’s (2011)method,
one would combine such “same-modality”
trialswith“mixed-modality” trials, inwhich
participants decide between options pre-
sented via different modalities, e.g., where
theydecidebetweenmusicpresentedvia the
short auditory previews and music that is
presented visually (using album covers).
Varying modalities can in principle be
combined with varying reward types.
From an experimental point of view, one
would want to vary these two dimensions
as independently as possible. This restricts
what kinds of options can be offered in
such an experiment, since some rewards
are not easy to identify across different
sensorymodalities. For instance, it is hard
to identify money by smell. Hence, to ex-
tend Levy and Glimcher’s (2011) design
(using same- and mixed-reward type tri-
als) by this additional dimension (same-
and mixed-modality trials), one would
have to present participants with options
that can be identified easily across themo-
dalities used in the study.
It should be noted that although several
studies (Plassmann et al., 2008; Valentin
and O’Doherty, 2009) have delivered stim-
uli usingmodalities other than vision in the
scanner, these studies were designed to an-
swer different questions and hence do not
resolve the issuewe raise here. First, all stim-
uli within each of these studies were pre-
sented in the same way, i.e., there were no
mixed-modality choices of the sort we are
proposing. Second, non-visual stimulus
presentation occurrednot at the stage of de-
cision value, but at later stages, designed to
track outcome value (upon consumption)
or anticipated value (after decisions but be-
fore consumption).
To conclude, Levy and Glimcher’s
(2011) study convincingly makes the case
that vmPFC encodes decision values for
food andmonetary rewards on a common
scale. We believe their experimental de-
sign is well suited for an extension to
choice situations where the options are
presented using different modalities.
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